STATEMENT OF CASE.

Paige (N. Y.), 126; Whipple v.
Whitman, 13 R 1. 512; S. C., 43
Am. Rep. 42. If one of several
payments to the attorney in specific articles is received by the principal, and no objection is made,
such payments will go in discharge
of the debt in the same way as if
made in money: Patten v. Fullerton, 27 Me. 58.
The remedies of the client are
many and various. He may proceed against the attorney, if he
choose, so ratifying his action and
discharging the debtor: Chapman
v. Cowles, 41 Ala. 1O3; Lord v.
Burbank, I8 Me. 178; Fitch v.
Scott, 3 How. (Miss.) 314. If judgment has been entered on thi compromise, he may have it vacated:

Dalton v. West End St. Ry. Co.
(the principal case) (Mass.), 34 N.
E. Rep. 261. If that has not bden
done, he may ignore the compromise, and proceed with tie original
action: Jones v. Inness, 32 Kan.
177; Davis ;Y. Severance (Minn.),
52 N. W. Rep. 14o; Dooley v.
Dooley, 9 Lea. (Tenn.) 3o6. Or if
the compromise be made on a judgment, after issuing execution, he
may reissue execution: Wright'v.
Daily, 26 Tex. 73o.
The rules laid down in the preceding discussion apply to proctors
in admiralty, equally with attorneys: Bates v. Seabury, i Sprague,
433ARDEMUS STEWART.
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". STATEMENT OF CASE.

The corporation plaintiff was incorporated by the concurrent legislation of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Some of the officials were
resident in one State, others in the
other. Toll gates were erected on
the Pennsylvania bank and tolls
collected there. Taxes on one-half

of the bridge (considered as a structure, without reference to the extent
of travel upon it, or the profits derived from it) were paid annually
to New Jersey, and on the same
basis with regard to the other half
taxes were paid to Peiinsylvania.
The Legislature of New Jersey
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passed a further Act (April i8th,
1884), entitled "An Act to provide
for the imposition of State taxes
upon certain corporations, etc.,"
which required from the corporation plaintiff, the payment of "a
yearly license fee or tax of onetenth of one per cent. on the
amount of the capital stock."
The payment of -the latter tax
was made under protest, and was
resisted on these grounds (the above
statement of facts being agreed
upon) : ist, that this was a tax upon
interstate commerce, and so in
violation of the Constitution of the
United States; 2d, that upon the
principles of public law, the power
of erecting a bridge or taking tolls

thereon, over a navigable river,
which forms the co-terminous
boundary between two States, can
only be conferred by the concurrent legislation of both States, and
such charters are subject to alteration and repeal in a like manner
only; 3d, that the corporation being
a foreign corporation, collecting
tolls at its gates, within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania, the State of
NewJersey could not impose atax by
way of a license fee upon it or upon
its franchises; and 4th, that even
if the tax were valid, the assessment
should have been made upon onehalf the amount of the capital
stock instead of upon the whole
amount.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Court (GARRiSON, J., delivering the opinion) upheld the
constitutionality of. the tax, saying
that the Federal Constitution will
not invalidate a State tax imposed
upon domestic corporations, generally because it incidentally affects
one that, under State authority, is
engaging in interstate commerce.
"This yearly license fee, continued
the Court, is, in short, a poll tax
levied upon domestic corporations
for the right to be, without regard
to the powers that under such form
they may exercise.
Such a fee
may be exacted by the State from
which the right is derived without

reference to the nature of the
business the corporation may be
authorized to carry on, and is constitutional, even as against a
domestic corporation created for
the purpose -of engaging in commerce with an adjoining State."
The fourth ground of objection the
Court answered by saying that the
right of corporate existence is, in
its nature, indivisible, and the fee,
therefore, must be necessarily an
entirety, no matter where the property of the company is situated, or
how its capital is invested or
employed.
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That the power to regulate commerce between the States is committed exclusively to Congress, and
that, unless it choses to exercise its
power in that direction, suth commerce shall be free from statutory
regulations of any kind, is a wellestablished principal of constitutional law: Robbins v. Taxing
9

FRANCHISE.

District, 120 U. S., and the long
list of cases there cited by Mr.
Justice BRADLEY.

The word regulation has grown
to have a more or less technical,
or rather special meaning as employed by the federal Supreme
Court.
In State Tax on gross
Receipts, 15 Wallace, 284, the fol-
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lowing words are used: ." It is not
everything that affects commerce
that amounts to a regulation of it,
within the meaning- of the constitution." (See also Robbins v. Taxing District, sup ra.)
The police power of the States
authorize the passage of Acts which
may affect interstate commerce by
virtue of the right and duty to provide for the "security of the lives,
limbs, health and .comfort of persons."
Legislation which deals
distinctly with the physical welfare
and happiness of the citizen falls
naturally within this class. The
exception is even extended, and,
under this same police power, the
States may secure the protection
of property, -although business
which reaches beyond the State
,limit may be incidentally affected
thereby.
But wherever such purely police
regulations are made by a State, or
wherever a State enacts laws, less
distinctly recognizable as falling
within that class, such as the establishment and supervision of highways, canals, ferries, railroads,
bridges and other - commercial
agencies, and facilities the operation of the law must not directly
affect interstate commerce. This,
then, would seem to be the test:
Does a State law whose constitutionality is impeached on these
grounds, operate directly against
an interstate business, whatever
may be its character, or does it
merely reach in a casual way one
or more of the agencies of that
business. The law must, of course,
be in other respects legitimate.
In considering the long line of cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court, involving the constitufionality of State laws alleged
to be in conflict with the com-

merce clause of the constitution,
the subject of taxation is the important one. The daming of a navigable stream is a rare occurrence as
compared with the tolls charged
for transportation over its ferries or
on its bridges. The general subject
of taxation cannot be considered
here, but the cases in which the
Supreme Court has passed upon
State legislation extending through
various forms of taxation to the
commerce which claified exemption from its operation under the
federal law sufficiently indicate the
line of argument by which the New
Jersey Court reached its conclusion
in this case. The case may be
divided into two general groups:
first, those in which the State law
has been set aside as an unwarrantable regulation of commerce ; and
second, those -which upheld the
legislation, notwithstanding that it
may have had an incidental affect
or influence upon that commerce.
Within the first gioup may be
first donsidered the instances in
which the State law imposes a
burden upon the citizens of other
States doiug business within its
territory, from which its own citizens are exempt. In Guy v. Baltimore, 1oo U. S. 434, the city of Baltimore passed an ordinance requiring the payment of fees for the use
of the city's wharves by all vessels
.laden with the products of other
States, but exempting those landing with Maryland products. The
court said that " these fees must
be looked upon, not as a compensation for the use of the city's property, but as a mere expedient or
device to foster the domestic commerce of Maryland by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon
the industry and business of other
States." This was a case of dis-
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crimination pure and simple. In
Webber v. Virginia, 1O3 U. S. 344,
a Virginia statute required the
agent of manufacturers without the
State to obtain county license fees
and pay a specific license tax in
Virginia before selling his goods,
but excepted the agents of Virginia
manufacturers from the operation
of the law. "Commerce among
the States is not free," said the
court, "whenever a commodity is,
by reason of its foreign growth or
manufacture, subjected by State
legislation to discriminating regulations or burdens, the statute is in
conflict with the commerce clause
of the constitution and void:"
(Mr. Justice F=n D.)
In Walling v. Michigan, II6 U.
S. 446, practically the same state of
facts existed as in the above case.
The license lax in question was,
however, levied upon the sale of
intoxicating liquors manufactured
in other States, a subject which
would seem to fall more clearly
within the police power of the
State.
The case illustrates the
force of the constitutional protection over interstate commerce in
the face of the highest power
claimed by the States.
Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129,
and Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129
U. S. 141, are further examples
of discrimination.
But it is not on the ground of
discrimination only that a state tax
may be declared void. The nature
of the subject, upon which the tax
is levied, is sometimes sufficient to
cover it with the cloak of federal
authority and protection. In case
of State Freight Tax, 15 Wallace,
232, the State of Pennsylvania
passed an Act taxing freight transported over the railway, etc., withoutregard to whether it was car-
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ried beyond the State limits or not.
The court held that "the transportation of freight, or of the subjects
of commerce, is a constituent part
of commerce itself, and that, whenever the subject in regard to which
a power to regulate commerce is
asserted are in their nature natidnal, or admit of one uniform
system of regulation, they are exclusively within the regulating
control of Congress. Transportation of passengers or merchandise
through a State, or from one State
to another is of this nature."
Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S.
566, is an example of a State tax
levied nominally vpon an occupation, but really upon the subject of
the business. The tax in question
was upon the amount of sales of
goods made by auctioneers. The
Court held that it amounted to a
tax on the goods themselves, and
consequently as applying to imported goods in the original packages was unconstitutional.
See also Brown v. Houston, 114
U. S. 622, and Lyng v. Michigan,
135 U. S. I6I.
The State tax may be void, not
only as discriminating against citizens of other States, or as burdening directly the goods transported
but also as being a tax upon the
business engaged in intestate commerce, because imposed upon the
business itself directly or upon its
earning, methods or agencies.
The following cases declared
State Acts void as affecting directly
intestate business: Pensacola Tel.
Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. I;
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S.460; Wabash St. L. & P. R. Ry.
Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557; Telegraph Co. v. Ratterman, 127 U. S411; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S.
64o.

-132.
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In these the tax was or amounted
to a tax on earnings: Fargo v.
Michigan, 121 U. S. 230; Phil. &
Southern S. S. Co. v. Penna., 122
U. S. 326. While the following -are
examples of
taxes operating
againet the agencies of commerce:
Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U.
.S.489: McCall v. California, 136,
"U. S. io4; Railroad Co. v. Penna.,
136 U.'S. 114; Crutcher v. Ken-tucky, 141 U. . 47..
The cases which comprise the
second general group, Qr those in
which State legislation has been
upheld, were where interstate commerce was incidentally affected may
now be considered.
The levying of a tax on the ferry
boats owned by ferry keepers livilig
within the State, was held, in Wiggin's Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis,
-107 U. S. 365, a.valid regulation
imposed under the State police
power. The Court said that "the
power to license is a police power,
although it may also be e~ercised
for the purpose of raising revenue."
See also Maine v. Gtand Trunk
Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217."
The right to impose fees for
wharfage is upheld, although the
wharf owner may be a municipal
corporation and the steamboats
mooring thereat enrolled and
licensed: Packet Co. v. Keokuk,
95 U. S. 8o. See also Packet Co. v.
East St. Louis, 100 U. S. 428;
Parkersburg Transportation Co. v.
Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 698; Packet
Co. v. Aiker, 121 U. S. 444.
It remains to note the instance in
which the capital stock and similar
property of corporations have been
taxed and, finally, the question to
what extent the less tangible corporate franchises and privileges are
liable.
In W. U. Tel. Co. v. Att'y-Gen-

eral, 125 U. S. 530, the State of
Massachusetts had imposed a tax
upon the W. U. Telegraph Co.
upon its property owned and used
within the State, the 'value of
which was ascertained by comparing the length of its lines in that
State with the length of its entire
lines. The Court declared the tax
to be distinctly an excise tax. The
tax was levied upon the capital
stock of the company. It was
upheld by the Court.
In Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Penna., 141 U. S, x8, it was held
that "a State statute imposing a
tax on the capital stock of all corporations engaged in the transportation of* freight and passengers
within the State, under which a
corporation of another State engaged in running railroad cars
into, through and out of the State,
is taxed by taking as the basis of
assessment such proportion of its
capital stock as the number of
miles of railroad ovei which its
cars are run within the State, bears
to the whole number of miles in
this and other States over vihich
its cars are run, does not vioiate the
commerce clause of the constitution."
Thus, the capital stockof a foreign
corporation doing business within
another State is the proper subject
of taxation .in the latter State, provided that the basis of assessment is
not the whole of the stock,but only
that which stands for the amount
of property owned or operated in
the taxing State.
Does the same rate apply in the
taxing of franchises and privileges?
In Delaware R. R. Tax, I8Wallace,
2o6, the Court said, "the State may
impose taxes upon the corporation
as an entity existing under its
laws, as well as upon its capital
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stock or its separate corporate
property."
(See also Maine v.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S.
217.)
In Horn Silver Mining Co. v.
New York, 143 U. S. 305, a statute
of New York imposed a tax upon
the corporate franchise or business
of every corporation, etc., incorporated or organized by the law of
that State or of any other State,
but doing busines in New York,
the tax to be computed. by a percentage upon its whole capital
stock. The corporation in question
was incorporated in Utah, but di
a small part of its business in New
York. The tax was ppheld. The
Court said, that "the right and

privilege, or the franchise, as it
may be termed, of being a corpora-

tion is of great- value to its memberspand is considered as property,
separate and distinct from the
property the corporation itself may
acquire." Continuing, the Court
declared that the tax being valid
in other ways did not operate as a
burden upon or interference with
interstate commerce, as it was
neither directed against any of
the subjects of that commerce
nor descriminated against
the
citizens of other States.
It is upon this latter case that the
New Jersey Court appears to have
principally based its decision,
although the Court makes the following distinction as to the use of
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the word "franchise" in the two.
instances, saying," The franchise
that is taxed as property is the
privilege enjoyed by a corporation
of exercising certain powers derived from the State, whereas the
franchise with which we have to,
do, is the right to exist in corporate
form without reference to the
powers that, made that form, the
company may exercise. In this.
State (New Jersey) we tax each of
these so called franchises. The
latter tax is, in short, a poll tax
levied upon a domestic corporation
for the right to be. Such a tax is
not upon property or assets, and
does not in any way concern the
nature of the business the company
may be authorized to carry on."
The doctrine of this case may be
said to be this: That a State tax
levied upon a corporation engaged
in a business of an exclusively
interstate character, although based
upon the whole amount of the
capital stock, whether it be held
within the State or not, does not
conflict with the federal power over
interstate commerce, provided that
the corporation is incorporated
within the State, and falls within
the operation of a law in other respects valid. The fact that the corporation was also chartered in the
neighboring State, does not alter
the question.
W. T. tErLs-

